LETTERS & NON-LETTERS

THE WHITE HOUSE, ZIONISM AND ISRAEL

Elmer Berger



THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES

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The White House, Zionism and Israel

by

ELMER BERGER

with an introduction by

MICHAEL ADAMS

THE INSTITUTE FOR PALESTINE STUDIES
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Contents

Introduction by Michael Adams 1

Elmer Berger to the President 7

Elmer Berger to the President 8

Noble M. Melencamp to Elmer Berger 19

Elmer Berger to the President 20

Noble M. Melencamp to Elmer Berger 29

Elmer Berger to Noble M. Melencamp 30

Elmer Berger to Noble M. Melencamp 37

Elmer Berger to Noble M. Melencamp 38

William D. Blair to "Fellow American" 44

Elmer Berger to the President 50

Michael B. Smith to Elmer Berger 52

Elmer Berger to Michael B. Smith 53

Introduction

by

MICHAEL ADAMS*

To those of us who are concerned with the search for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the attitude of the American government is of consuming interest. In the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, American influence played a crucial role, a role which must carry with it a measure of responsibility for the tragedy that ensued. If that tragedy is to be brought to an end and if, in the succeeding phase, there is to be any hope of establishing in the Middle East a durable peace, then American influence will again have to be exercised—but this time not in the exclusive interests of one party to the dispute, but with the aim of ensuring for all the peoples of the area equal rights and equal benefits.

It is vital therefore that those who exercise supreme power in the United States of America should be in possession of all the facts about the Middle East conflict; that they should resolve to base their decisions on those facts and not on considerations of electoral advantage; and that they should not

*MICHAEL ADAMS was Middle East correspondent for the *Guardian* from 1956 to 1961 and since that time has remained in close touch with Arab affairs. He is the author of *Suez and After* (Boston, 1958) and *Chaos or Rebirth: The Arab Outlook* (London, 1968).

commit the American people to policies which, in the years to come, will further discredit the American ideal in the eyes of the greater part of humanity.

In the context of the Middle East, no American can claim to have done more than Dr. Elmer Berger to induce a responsible approach on the part of his government. For a quarter of a century he has fought for the concept of justice between Arab and Jew in Palestine, and has tried by all the means at his disposal to dissuade successive American administrations from policies as damaging to fundamental American interests as they have been to the peace and well-being of the Middle East. For this reason the pages that follow must be of interest to any student of Middle East affairs and, above all, to any American who is concerned about his country's role in the world and who asks himself why it should be that, at a time when the power of the United States has never been greater, American influence should be receding before a resentful tide of disillusionment throughout the Third World.

In these pages is reproduced a correspondence between Dr. Berger, writing as President of the organisation "American Alternatives to Zionism," and the personal staff of the President of the United States. To put it like this is, however, inexact, for the word "correspondence" suggests an exchange, and the exchange in this case consists of long and carefully argued letters from Dr. Berger and very brief and evasive replies from staff assistants to the President, plus one Department of State form letter.

It would perhaps be unfair to suggest that the disparity reflects the different degrees of interest which Dr. Berger and the White House attach to the problems under discussion. It is not, I believe, unfair to conclude that when he wrote on behalf of the President of the United States, Mr. Melencamp said little because there was very little he could say in reply to the arguments advanced by Dr. Berger. The arguments, as the reader will see, are closely reasoned. They represent the

fruit of long experience, an experience probably unrivalled in the particular aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict which are here discussed. They present for any American, but most of all for those responsible for the shaping and the execution of American policy, damning evidence about the way in which that policy has been—and is still being—distorted by a partiality most alien to the best in the American national tradition.

Briefly, Dr. Berger concerns himself with the American Government's attitude towards Israel, with special reference to Israel's character as a Zionist state. and with the effects of that American attitude on the prospects for peace in the Middle East. In his first letter to the President, which is dated August 25, 1970 (so that he is writing in the context of the American peace initiative in the Middle East, which has just been launched in the form of the "Rogers Proposals"), Dr. Berger takes as his starting-point a report from the *New York Times* of a "briefing session" held in the White House earlier in that month. The President and various of his advisers, including Dr. Henry Kissinger, were present and according to the report that appeared in the *New York Times* the newsmen who attended were told that:

> the [American] Administration saw no chance for a settlement if the Arab states maintained their demand for the return of 1.3 million Palestinian refugees to their lands, without giving Israel assurance that she was not expected to take them all back at the risk of altering the fundamental Jewish character of the state of Israel.

Examining the implications of this statement, as he does at some length in his first letter to the President, Dr. Berger warns him that, in suggesting any limitation on the right of the refugees to return to Palestine, his government would be adopting a position irreconcilable with its own constitutional and international obligations—but, more than this, he urges that for the American government to adopt such a position would damage the prospects of peace in the Middle East,

because it would help to perpetuate what Dr. Berger calls "the historic ambiguities of the 'national home' policy." And those ambiguities, as he rightly says, have been from the outset the root of all the trouble in Palestine.

If only those concerned with devising a solution for the Middle East, instead of tinkering with the superficial aspects of the problem, would attack it at its roots, how different the prospect would look! If the President of the United States, and Dr. Kissinger, and all of the officials who devote so much time to drafting and revising and discarding their provisional proposals and interim solutions, would only look frankly at those "ambiguities"—and try to clarify them—then a solution might no longer look like a will-o'-the-wisp, forever disappearing over the next horizon. This, of course, is what they have failed to do, or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they have been disinclined to do it; and as a result, their efforts so far have met with no success. Dr. Berger deserves our admiration for the patience and the consistency—and the courage—with which he perseveres in the attempt to draw their attention back to the fundamentals of the problem.

The original idea, as it was presented to the outside world, of a "national home," a refuge in Palestine for Jews threatened with persecution elsewhere, had much to recommend it to humanitarian opinion. Immediately that idea was transformed into the totally different idea of a Zionist *state* in Palestine, a state imposed without consultation on the existing population of the land, it lost all trace of legitimacy. As Dr. Berger insists in the first of the letters reproduced below, the Palestine problem grew out of the very simple fact that "Zionism could not develop and establish a Zionist state without infringing the rights of the Palestinians." There can be no possible argument about this; it is the statement of an elementary truth, although one which has been consistently and deliberately overlooked for half a century. For the Arabs who lived in Palestine, the prospect of a Zionist state (or of any other kind of state which did not reflect the wishes of the

vast majority of the population of Palestine) meant and could only mean a choice between two unpalatable alternatives: the Palestinians must emigrate from their homeland or they must submit to alien rule. There was no other way open to them, except to resist; and when they resisted, they found themselves in conflict, not with a handful of impecunious settlers, but first of all with the might of Britain in its last imperial phase, and later with the rising power of the United States.

Paradoxically—and Dr. Berger in these letters drives this point home as far as it concerns the American attitude today—these Western powers exerted themselves to achieve in Palestine something which ran counter to all of their own national traditions and aspirations. A Zionist state, by its nature discriminatory and exclusive—and, worse still, basing its discrimination on grounds of race and religion—was imposed on a territory the majority of whose inhabitants were Arabs. When those Arabs, theoretically protected by the terms of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate of the League of Nations, found themselves the victims of Zionist discrimination, the Western powers did nothing to carry out their obligations. On the contrary, they encouraged the Zionists to evade their responsibilities towards the Palestinian Arabs, until today (returning to Dr. Berger's starting-point) we see the President of the United States openly suggesting that the decisions of the United Nations concerning the right of the refugees to return to Palestine cannot be implemented because this would "alter the fundamental Jewish character of the state of Israel."

Relentlessly, Dr. Berger exposes the inconsistencies and the moral derelictions which underlie such an attitude on the part of the American government. Quite apart from the tragic implications it has for the Palestinians, he points to the decline of American influence and the extent of Soviet relations in the Middle East as the natural results of "a policy which has been inconsistent with all of our national interests

in the Arab world and inconsistent as well with American and international law." These are arguments which one might expect to carry weight with an American President. They are arguments which have too seldom been clearly presented to the American public. If, through this publication, they can now be heard and digested, not only by Americans with responsibilities in the field of policy-making, but by Americans in every walk of life who care for their national tradition of democratic thought and action, there may still be time for American influence to be exerted in the direction of justice and of humanity in the Middle East. If not, then American support for Zionism will continue to frustrate the efforts of the World community to establish in the Middle East a peace based, not on discrimination, not on injustice, not on the power of one people to dominate and dispossess another, but on the equal right of all peoples—and that includes Palestinians—to enjoy life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

August 25, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

The very complicated substance of the enclosed letter regrettably makes its length unavoidable. But the critical importance of its content, in the light of your Administration's new initiatives for a settlement of the central problem of the Middle East, encourages me to hope the letter will be read by you, or some member of your staff with responsibilities in this field.

In an effort to stimulate such a reading and study, I take the liberty of summarizing here the content of the letter.

The motivation for writing you derives from a newspaper report of August 17 which said, in substance, that the United States believed it necessary to assure "the fundamental Jewish character of the state of Israel" by restricting the numbers of Palestinians who might choose to exercise the right of repatriation.

Assuming the accuracy of the report, the enclosed full-length letter makes the following points:

1. Such a restriction would be inconsistent with the generally recognized international legal agreements pertaining to the Palestine problem.

2. It is also inconsistent with the declared legal policy of the Government of the United States, based upon Constitutional obligations of all branches of the United States Government.

3. It is an immoral and arbitrary position for the United States Government to take, for it would perpetuate a political system in Israel which is discriminatory with respect to race and/or religious faith.

4. It would be an American position predicated upon a repugnant and, indeed, an outworn ideology no longer consistent with facts.

5. It will not contribute to Middle East peace but will rather continue the historic ambiguities of the "national home" policy which were—and remain—the primary cause of instability in the Palestine question.

With my grateful appreciation for whatever consideration your Administration will give to the reasoned arguments in the full-length letter supporting these contentions, I am

Very respectfully yours,

ELMER BERGER
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

August 25, 1970

Dear Mr. President:

All but the most inconsolable purists welcome your new initiative in the Middle East and hope for its success.

This recent diplomacy, following upon Secretary Rogers' June proposals, offers the best hope in more than 20 years for a just and enduring peace in the Arab/Zionist/Israel conflict. Precisely for this reason I take the liberty of writing you with respect to a "background briefing," reported in the *New York Times* on August 17. The report states the briefing session was held "by the White House" on Friday, August 14

and that you, Dr. Kissinger "and other Administration officials" were present.

Part of the briefing, apparently, concerned the Middle East crisis and the *Times* story reports as follows:

> The news editors were also told that the Administration saw no chance for a settlement if the Arab states maintained their demand for the return of 1.3 million Palestinian refugees to their lands, without giving Israel assurance that she was not expected to take them all back at the risk of altering the fundamental Jewish character of the state of Israel.

It is not my purpose here to attempt to examine too closely into the precise meaning of the newspaper language describing the position reportedly taken by your Government on this particular aspect of the Middle East problem. It is, of course, uncertain now that "the Arab states" can effectively make the ultimate decision for the Palestinians.

This, however, is not the consideration in the "refugee" problem to which I address this letter. My concern here is rather with the reason reportedly given by a member of your Administration for limiting the numbers of Palestinians who may elect—in accordance with United Nations resolutions reiterated each year since 1949—to return to their "lands." The reason, reportedly advanced, is that if "all" of the Palestinians should elect to return it might alter "the fundamental Jewish character of the State of Israel."

Assuming the accuracy of the report, a matter of high principle is involved and not merely some bargaining position over numbers which might be a strategic or tactical question related to the possibility of finally resolving this fifty-year-old conflict between Zionism and the fundamental rights of Palestinians who are not Zionists. It is precisely because Zionism could not develop and establish a Zionist state without infringing the rights of Palestinians who are not Zionists which created and expanded the central problem in Palestine.

It is of first importance to note here that not all Palestinian anti-Zionists were (or are) Christians or Moslems. The first

recorded protest against Zionism made to an American diplomatic representative in Jerusalem came from Jerusalem's Jews, who urged the United States Government not to lend its support to the Balfour Declaration. This footnote in history is so important because it illustrates that the Zionist-anti-Zionist controversy cannot, in any legitimate sense whatsoever, be categorized as either a religious dispute or as involving the question of what is so loosely called "anti-Semitism."

The negotiating history of the Balfour Declaration clearly reveals that the parties involved were all aware of the danger which Zionist aspirations represented to the rights of all anti-Zionists. Largely at the insistence of anti-Zionist Jews of England at the time—and despite strong Zionist opposition—the drafters of the Declaration limited its political promise clause, favoring "a national home for the Jewish people," with two safeguard clauses. The first of these guaranteed the "civil and religious rights" of the Arab "communities." The second guaranteed, against prejudice of any kind, "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country" than Palestine.

The Zionist movement has successfully flouted both of these safeguards throughout all of the 50 years since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. From the early 1920's when, under the British Mandate, Zionism began to put its practical program in Palestine into operation, until 1948, it aggressively practiced separatism. Working assiduously, financed in large part by tax-deductible American money, it built an infra-structure in Palestine which progressively advantaged Jews and disadvantaged Arabs. While apartheid in its blatant contemporary meaning may be too strong a word to describe Zionist policy, the infra-structure which Zionism built in Palestine fragmented the population and insured the development of a country divided against itself. Moreover, this segregationalist Zionist society was imposed upon the majority of the country by a political institution which always represented a minority of the population. The minority was enabled

to prevail because of Great Power support, first by the British and during the last two decades, regrettably, by the United States.

This consistent American support of the Zionist political, economic and social conception of Palestinian society has tragically and even hazardously reduced our country's prestige and influence in the Arab world.

In 1948 the recommended partition of Palestine produced a civil war. A large migration of Arabs fleeing hostilities took place. The published records of those who were then the Zionist militants confirm a deliberate policy, from late 1947 to April-May of 1948, to uproot the Arabs from their large centers of population such as Jaffa. And the "refugee" problem was born. It was expanded in 1967 when the Israeli government refused to repatriate the several hundred thousand "new refugees" created during the war of that year.

The displacement of the Palestinian Arabs served the geo-political objectives of Zionism; and the consistent Israeli refusal to comply with the will of the world community of nations, legislated by the United Nations on December 11, 1949, and reiterated every year since, allowing the Palestinians a free choice between "repatriation and compensation," is the root-cause of the Palestine problem. Israeli authorities have frequently stated that their refusal to permit such freedom of choice, based upon what the last General Assembly of the United Nations explicitly called an "inalienable right," is justified because to accede to the right would jeopardize the "Jewish" character of the Israeli state.

You have repeatedly said, either directly or through some member of your Administration, that the parties to the dispute must resolve the outstanding issues themselves; and you have indicated that the United States will not be party to imposing a settlement.

Perhaps more than any of the other issues in dispute, this question of some fair and equitable formula for resolving the problem of the displaced Palestinians must be determined by

some formula eventually mutually agreed to among the principal parties. For to whatever extent this aspect of the Palestine problem is left unresolved, just exactly to this extent will any "peace" be eventually challenged and, probably, seriously threatened. More than in any other aspect of the problem of Palestine, therefore, the mutual satisfaction of the principal parties is important.

Nevertheless, as a political fact-of-life, the power and prestige of the United States is being used—and, quite properly, will be used—to attempt to reconcile the interests of the parties to this stubborn dispute. And it would be tragic, indeed, if this present initiative, which has raised the hopes of so many throughout the world, were now to be dissipated for a commitment to something less than a principle which is basic not only in the Palestine problem itself, but which is elemental in the whole system of American values.

For this reason, I urge you *not* to predicate your Administration's approach to the question of Palestinian repatriation upon the anti-democratic, historically destructive concept of assuring the further Zionist character of the State of Israel. To do so will assuredly fail to contribute constructively to peace in the Middle East. It will also weaken our country's hand and moral position in other situations—not dissimilar in character—such as South Africa and Rhodesia. Once the true character of a Zionist state is appreciated, your Government's use of this criterion for determining who may and who may not live in Palestine may also have repercussions in our difficult domestic problems involving blacks and whites.

Although I put this proposition to you, essentially, on the moral level, I repeat that to underwrite the Zionist character of the State of Israel by depriving any Palestinians of their inscribed and "inalienable" rights also puts the United States in the untenable position of becoming an active party to an illegal action, in the context of all international agreements with respect to Palestine.

But it is not only the rights of the Arab Palestinians which

will be infringed if the United States successfully supports the proposition of insuring a Zionist state of Israel by restricting the rights of the Palestinians who are not Jews. By definition a Zionist state claims the competence to legislate for a nationality entity which it officially and formally calls "the Jewish people." A Zionist state claims also the right to impose national obligations upon this same nationality entity.

In Zionist legislation, "the Jewish people" is constituted of every Jew in the world, regardless of his or her normative citizenship and nationality. Among the national rights which the State of Israel has legislated for "the Jewish people" is the "right" to immigrate to Israel and, *automatically,* to acquire citizenship. The obligations which the Israeli state has legislated upon "the Jewish people" are stated, in general language, in a 1952 act of the Knesset called "The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency for Israel (Status) Law."

It was precisely to inscribe this "Jewish people" legislation in international law that the Zionists consistently insisted upon a "Jewish" majority as a *sine qua non* of any political formula ever advanced to resolve the Palestine problem; and Zionist pressures repeatedly were successful in preventing more democratic solutions of the problem precisely because by *any* democratic standards Zionists never enjoyed a working political majority in pre-Israel Palestine.

This "Jewish people" legislation—and the international Zionist apparatus which, together with the Israeli government, implements this legislation—makes Israel a "Jewish" or, more correctly, a Zionist state. And Zionist fear that such discriminatory legislation may be annulled should a democratic Israeli state develop an anti-Zionist majority is a major consideration in present Israeli policies. These policies not only deny the rights of the Palestinians. They also support energetic campaigns to recruit *Jewish* immigration to increase the arbitrarily sustained imbalance in the population. There are immigration recruitment centers in a number of American

cities, for example; and these intensive campaigns are financed out of the common Zionist funds augmented by the United Israel Appeal.

In a letter addressed to me on April 20, 1964, the then Assistant Secretary of State, Near Eastern Affairs, the Hon. Phillips Talbot, stated that as a matter of legal policy the United States "does not regard the 'Jewish people' concept as a concept of international law." Indeed, the United States could do nothing other than reject this concept, since this Zionist nationality discriminates between Americans on the basis of religious faith, even as it discriminates, on the same basis, between Palestinians. Regrettably, the United States Government has done nothing to apply this policy to the known realities of the Zionist/Israel operations in the United States.

It would be tragic if the United States Government were now to move from this sin of omission to become, in the new context of your Administration's recent initiative, an active protagonist for policies which reinforce this abnormal nationality concept as the fundamental character of the State of Israel. Once again, although I state this appeal in essentially moral terms, I am bound to emphasize that the Zionist actions of the state of Israel, together with its Zionist organizational appendages, are also illegal. They violate solemn guarantees inscribed in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate; and as Secretary Talbot stated in his April 20, 1964, letter to me, they are violative of the Constitution of the United States, as well.

One other consideration relevant to this so-called "Jewish character of the state of Israel" is worthy of your attention as your Government refines its thinking in the context of the possible movement toward peace which we hope your recent initiative will produce. As I have already said, one basic reason for the Zionist historic insistence upon a "Jewish" majority in Palestine was to have the sovereign power of a state structured to inscribe these "Jewish people" legislative

enactments into international law. Zionism regards such a state with such sovereign powers to be necessary because the conceptual basis for Zionist-nationality is the Zionist conviction that anti-Semitism is a universal and eternal phenomenon. The resultant—and inevitable—deprivation of nationality rights suffered by Jews, therefore, in any country in which they may live is to be compensated for by granting all Jews—"the Jewish people"—nationality rights in the Zionist state.

It cannot be denied that the Zionist development in mandated Palestine and the resultant state of Israel both afforded refuge and eventually citizenship to many Jews who were the victims of persecution, either virulent or sufficiently disabling or degrading to motivate them to resettle.

That admitted fact, however, can contribute to a distortion of reality unless there is added the further fact that more than half the present Jewish population of Israel are from Arab countries. For the most part their lives were dis-oriented in the backwash of the forcible establishment of the Zionist state in 1948. Prior to that time—and, indeed, in a number of Arab countries since—Jews have lived on a basis of equality with their Christian and Moslem fellow-citizens.

But in the more than 20 years during which the state of Israel has been sovereign and has initiated and sustained its Zionist "Jewish people" legislation, the majority of Jews in the world have *not* elected to become citizens of the country. That is to say, they have rejected the opportunity to make their alleged "Jewish people" nationality operable by accepting the automatically available Israeli citizenship.

In the light of this undeniable fact it is legitimate to ask why the present possibilities for a negotiated settlement should be jeopardized by a pre-condition in the form of a United States commitment to the "fundamental Jewish character of the state of Israel." Had the Jews of the world really wished for a sovereign state, arbitrarily structured to perpetuate a "Jewish" majority, for the purpose of providing an additional

set of functional nationality rights and obligations for "the Jewish people," they could long ago have exercised the option to go to such a state. Certainly it is contrary to all of the normal amenities between nations for responsible governments to agree that one category of their citizens may remain in one country, enjoying its rights and assuming its responsibilities, and at the same time claiming the rights and discharging the responsibilities of nationals of another country. The abnormality becomes even more striking when the designated dual-nationals are determined by either race or religious faith. And it may be repeated here for emphasis, it is inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States for the Government of this country to acquiesce in any such arrangement, let alone to become an active protagonist supporting a foreign government committed to this abnormal "Jewish people" nationality claim.

Even taking into account the 2,500,000 or so Jews in the Soviet Union, whose status there may be very unclear, the majority of the world's Jews have not opted for Israeli citizenship. Nor is there any reliable evidence suggesting they are willing to consider themselves, or be considered by others, as dual-nationals, enjoying functional nationality rights and obligations in Israel and also in whatever country they enjoy normal citizenship. Both of those assertions can be made with certainty about the Jews of the United States.

The insistence of the Israeli government, therefore, upon maintaining the "Jewish" character of the state, by denying the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, is unrealistic ideology. What it really means is to ask the world to endorse a certain obstacle to a possible peace, with all that you have indicated this implies for the peace of the world, in order to keep open a permanent option of Israeli citizenship in the interests of "the Jewish people." It is not capricious to say that this way there can never be peace. It is conceivable that some numerical formula for repatriation could be worked out with proper representatives of the Palestinians, *on the basis of present geo-*

political and demographic facts in the Middle East. But it is unlikely that any responsible Palestinians will be persuaded to yield any of their inscribed rights in the interests of maintaining a Zionist government in Israel, because in some indefinite future a new part of "the Jewish people" nationality constituency may decide to make its "Jewish people" nationality rights operable. And it is equally unlikely that either the Palestinians or the "Arab states" will agree to an arrangement which sanctions a continuation of "the Jewish people" nationality constituency discharging Israeli national obligations. Any such arrangement, in effect, perpetuates the dangerously ambiguous processes which accompanied the expansion of the ambiguous "national home" idea. It would, in other words, not only fail to produce a peace, but it would guarantee the perpetuation of the instability which has characterized the area ever since the issuance of the Balfour Declaration.

It is not only unlikely that the Palestinians or "the Arabs" will agree to such an arrangement. It is unreasonable to expect people with just and recognised rights to these lands to surrender these rights to people who have never had any normal, legal basis for claiming rights in Palestine; people who, in fact, have indicated they would not exercise those rights even if they exist.

For all these reasons, Mr. President—moral, legal and pragmatic—we respectfully urge you (assuming the report in the *New York Times* is accurate) not to jeopardize the precarious hopes which your initiative in the Middle East has stimulated, by lending the power and prestige of our country to the support of a racist/theocratic nationality concept the principal function of which is—and has always been—to assure by arbitrary and discriminatory processes a "Jewish" character for the State of Israel.

In the authentic traditions of Judaism and America, "Jewish" values are in any event spiritual, cultural and moral. Together with the Christian ethic they provide the moral and spiritual underpinnings for the American value system. To

sustain "Jewish" character in this sense it is not necessary to deprive people who are not Jews of their human and political rights. On the contrary, it is a tragic betrayal of the genuine values of Jewish identity, historically, if other people are arbitrarily dispossessed on the basis of some racist/theocratic quota system. And it would be a betrayal of all that is best of American ideals and aspirations for our country to try to shore up such a political system committed to such a society in another state where American influence will almost certainly play a large role in determining the future.

The complications in the way of effecting a settlement in this difficult problem are great enough. We respectfully suggest, Mr. President, that you not multiply them, particularly in lending the support of your Administration, which has made so constructive a first step, to an ideological rigidity which is of little practical meaning and which, to boot, is contrary to most of those values which we all wish our country to help advance throughout the world.

Very respectfully yours.

ELMER BERGER
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

Mr. Elmer Berger
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.
New York

October 16, 1970

Dear Mr. Berger:

It was thoughtful of you to let the President have the views expressed in your September 18* letter. You may be sure that he appreciates your interest in sharing your insights with him. Your comments in this instance, as earlier, have been given to appropriate members of Dr. Kissinger's staff, and you may be sure that your suggestions will receive the careful attention they merit.

With the President's best wishes,

Sincerely,

NOBLE M. MELENCAMP
Staff Assistant
to the President

*[A copy of a letter by Dr. Berger printed in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, September 12, 1970, making much the same points as his first letter, was sent to the White House, with a covering letter, on September 18. – ed.]

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

January 11, 1971

Dear Mr. President:

Together with tens of millions of other Americans I listened to and watched your "conversation" with the representatives of the television networks on Monday night, January 4th. As a concerned American, I thank you for your informative presentation of the basic thinking and goals of your Administration.

Because of experience and some recognized expertise in Middle East problems I listened most closely to your exposition of United States policy and strategies relevant to the Arab/Israeli conflict. With what I trust you will accept as proper deference to your office—and also to what you may *not* have said—I take the liberty of expressing the opinion that the necessarily brief summation of your Administration's present strategies revealed both an inadequacy and an inconsistency.

I refer particularly to your statement, as reported in the *New York Times* on January 5th, in which you said:

> The key to peace in the Mideast is held by several people. First the parties involved—the Israelis and their neighbors, primarily the U.A.R. and Jordan. But, second, the key to peace is in the hands of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France—the four major powers.
>
> If the Soviet Union does not play a conciliatory peace-making role, there is no chance for peace in the Mideast. Because if the Soviet Union continues to fuel the war arsenals of Israel's neighbors, Israel will have no choice but to come to the United States for us to maintain the balance to which Mr. Sevareid referred.
>
> And we will maintain that balance.

Mr. President, that is a plausible explanation of "the key to peace in the Mideast." But it is inadequate. It ignores the fundamental problem and essential nature of the Arab/Israeli conflict. Consequently it lacks any suggestion of American

responsibility for putting the power and prestige of our country behind an earnest effort to resolve the fundamental issue, without which there can be no "just and enduring peace."

This fundamental issue is the Zionist character of the State of Israel. By definition a State predicating its nationality rights and obligations upon Zionism is a discriminatory and exclusivist state. It is a state which claims in fact and in law that all Jews possess—functionally—Zionism's "Jewish people" nationality. "Jewish people" nationality not only assigns functional Israeli national rights and obligations to all Jews—regardless of their legal nationality. In Israel itself "Jewish people" nationals are "more equal" than any other category of Israeli citizen.

Israeli courts have held and the Knesset has declared by legislation that the prime criterion of this Zionist "Jewish people" nationality is religion. Only if a person professes Judaism, is born of a Jewish mother or is converted according to procedures acceptable to Israeli authorities, is it possible to qualify as a "Jewish people" national. This juridically determined and legislated religious criterion automatically discriminates against non-"Jewish people" nationals, particularly Christian and Moslem Palestinians whose human and political rights in Palestine have been reaffirmed repeatedly by the United Nations and with American support. In 1969 the United Nations declared these non-"Jewish people" Palestinians' rights to be inalienable; and in 1970 the United Nations affirmed the right of these Palestinians to "self-determination".

On August 25, 1970, I wrote you in some detail with respect to this "Jewish people" nationality of the state of Israel. I urged you, both on the basis of international and American constitutional law, not to put the power and prestige of the United States behind this concept. On October 16, Mr. Melencamp, of your staff, acknowledged this letter and advised that it had "been given to appropriate members of Dr. Kissinger's staff." I was assured my "suggestions and

recommendations will receive the careful attention they merit."

I enclose a copy of my August 25th letter, and I take the liberty of observing that, in substance, it addressed itself to very little which can accurately be called "suggestions or recommendations." It recites basic and demonstrable facts about the character of Israel's "Jewish people" nationality, together with references to basic American law and policy-declarations by senior officials of the United States Government who have had responsibilities in this problem.

While I was somewhat disappointed not to have received a substantive response to such a letter, I am aware of the delicate nature of this problem. This disappointment, however, was transformed into renewed concern when, according to an authoritative Jewish Telegraphic Agency report, published in the United States on December 11, 1970, you were reported to have assured the Prime Minister of Israel:

> The U.S. attitude toward the Arab refugee problem . . . [would be conditioned by] . . . the American view [that] the Jewish character of the State of Israel must be maintained.

This American position, reportedly, was conveyed to Mrs. Meir in an exchange of largely secret letters between her and you, in which the Israeli government was seeking assurances of American support for certain Israeli positions or conditions for re-entering the Jarring talks.

On December 27 the *New York Times* published extensive excerpts from an interview which James Reston had with the Israeli Prime Minister. A very considerable part of that interview appears to confirm the promise of your government to support the so-called "Jewish" (really Zionist) "character of the State of Israel." For repeatedly the Israeli Prime Minister referred to the "sovereignty of the Jewish people." According to her—and her government's commitment to Zionist nationality—the state of Israel is the internationally recognized repository of this "sovereignty."

I will not repeat here, Mr. President, the fundamental

legal and historical arguments against American support of this proposition which are discussed comprehensively in my August 25, 1970 letter. But I do feel constrained to point out that your statement during the "conversation" on Monday night, January 4th, was inadequate insofar as you suggested the primary responsibility for peace resides with "the Israelis and their neighbors, primarily the U.A.R. and Jordan."

The *Israelis* could make the determination to end the exclusivist and discriminatory character of their state by renouncing its Zionist "Jewish people" nationality. It is encouraging that some (probably small) numbers of Israelis are thinking in such terms. But the present Zionist-oriented regime in Israel has resisted—and will continue to resist—this fundamental alteration. Although they have long insisted that this Zionist exclusivism is the basis of their conflict with Israel, certainly neither the U.A.R. nor Jordan can effectuate this change.

The fact is that the political and financial base of the Zionist structure, which implements the illegal and undemocratic "Jewish people" nationality policy, is in the United States. Records of our own diplomacy prove the inordinate influence the apparatus has had politically; and, in the current financial year it is the stated financial objective of the Zionist movement to export at least $400 million of "charitable," tax-deductible funds alone to Israel. This Zionist structure is—or, more accurately ought to be—subject to relevant United States laws. Its compliance with our Foreign Agents Registration legislation and our tax laws are both very much open to question, to understate the situation. This Zionist structure operating here is juridically linked to the Israeli government through Israeli/Zionist Organization legislation. It is either an integral part of Israel's government or a licensed agent of it. But the apparatus is permitted to conduct its affairs in the United States with all the impunity of an authentic, voluntary, American association. And that is why, Mr. President, your identification of the parties "primarily" responsible for peace in the Middle East, during the "conversation" with the

television commentators, was inadequate. For today, the United States is the principal supporter and sponsor of the supra-national agency which the Israeli government uses to advance the anti-democratic claims of its discriminatory Zionist nationality. Many Americans know all this—but they have had a difficult time communicating with your Administration. To them—and to a majority of the Arabs as well as to many Israelis who sincerely desire peace—this affirmative support which the United States provides to the entire Zionist mechanism makes the United States a major party to the corrective actions which must be taken if there is to be a "just and enduring peace."

This assessment leads, in turn, to the inconsistency in your exposition of our Middle East posture during the "conversation." I refer, particularly, to your statement that:

> If the Soviet Union does not play a conciliatory peacemaking role, there is no chance for peace in the Mideast.

The statement is, again, plausible. It assumes the Soviet Union can control the attitudes of the governments and people of the Arab states which are parties to the conflict. But you offered no indication that the United States could—or would—attempt commensurate control of Israeli policies and actions. In fact, members of your Government have suggested, from time to time that it is impossible for the United States to exercise such control.

As your statement stands, therefore, it encourages Americans in the cultivated prejudice that "the Arabs" are—and have been—willing collaborators with the Soviets in order to realize Soviet historic aspirations in the Middle East. The statement also implies that in the present circumstances the Soviets hold all the cards and "the Arabs" will supinely do the Soviets' bidding. These conclusions, which I know were encouraged —however unwittingly—by your formulation of the problem, are contrary to the facts.

Soviet deep penetration of this area of the world has been

in direct proportion to United States derelictions precisely with respect to the rights of the non-"Jewish people" Palestinians who have been deprived of those rights as an inevitable consequence of Israel's exclusionary Zionist nationality. The more the United States has committed itself to sustaining an Israeli state which has employed force—and now the occupation of territory acquired by force—to defeat Arab efforts to defend and implement these rights, the more the Soviet Union advantaged itself by capitalizing upon "the Arabs'" long-standing and deepening sense of both national and individual injury. To have made this clear to the American people would have been to alert them to the true dimensions of the problem. No matter how they might have reacted, such an accurate and historically demonstrable formulation of the problem might have evoked some approximation of a referendum—which Americans have never been offered—on the real issues our country faces in the Middle East. As it is, most Americans are prone to believe we could continue our insufficiently discriminating support of Israel and, if it were not for Soviet malice, also enjoy the benefits of friendly relations with "the Arabs." Nothing could be farther from the truth and two decades of an almost uninterrupted decline of American prestige in the area stands as recorded evidence of this fallacy. Soviet penetration of the Middle East is not the cause of the decline of our own national fortunes in the area. It is simply symptomatic of more than twenty years of pursuit of a policy which has flouted the fundamental issues in the area's central political problem: a policy which has been inconsistent with all of our interests in the Arab world and inconsistent as well with American and international law.

On the basis of long experience, I am positive that it is beyond the capacity of the Soviet Union to coerce "the Arabs" to accept a more conciliatory police toward an Israel which, by the use of superior force and the occupation of territory acquired by force, insists upon this discriminatory nationality

policy. Assuming the Soviets would agree to try to force an agreement which does not confront this central issue, "the Arabs" could react desperately even to their own immediate disadvantage. Historically, the Palestine problem is replete with just such eruptions. The September 1970 "civil war" in Jordan provided evidence of such acts of desperation. If this were to happen again, as a result of Soviet efforts to gloss over the central issue in the problem, the resultant Israeli (and American) victory would be ephemeral and the hope for a "just and enduring peace" would be removed to an even more remote future. There would be chaos throughout the area. In the long run this would again aid Soviet aspirations more than our own, for certainly American interests in the Middle East are served best by stability, or—better—by orderly and disciplined progress.

The Soviet Union can, without doubt, exercise tactical political influence upon the U.A.R. But the suggestion that the exercise of such influence is a greater requisite to peace than comparable American influence upon Israel, which holds the key to this central issue of an exclusivist and discriminatory state in the heart of the Arab world, provides the inconsistency in your January 4th statement. That inconsistency serves only to rigidify the already dangerous polarization. It leaves the conflict at the level of superpower confrontation; and it leaves the American people—and any others who will be influenced by your exposition—no more enlightened about the genuine issues or the relative merits of the cases of the parties to the conflict.

Finally, Mr. President, I presume to suggest that both the inadequacy and inconsistency of your January 4th statement may be corrected—constructively—by a forthright declaration which, if it cannot persuade the present Israeli government to renounce the Zionist basis of its nationality policy, will bring about the containment of such an anti-democratic state to, at the most, its pre-June 1967 borders and would also compel the Israelis to rely upon their own Zionist-minded

citizens to finance the supra-national structure which implements this discriminatory nationality throughout the world. The United States can do this by a simple, even-handed application of existent United States law to the Zionist apparatus operating in our country. Published reports suggest that the Soviet Union would be amenable to trying to persuade the Arab state-parties to the conflict to come to terms with such a contained Zionist state. The resultant territorial and political solution would not satisfy all of the parties to the conflict. There would remain the almost puritanical claims and aspirations of the Palestinians for a secular, democratic state in all of Palestine. These claims ought not be cavalierly dismissed and certainly not callously ignored. Taken at face value they reflect the best of American political philosophy, with its emphasis upon the sanctity of the individual, regardless of creed or race. But, tragically, a long history of bitterness and hostility in Palestine, provoked in the beginning by the forceful imposition of Zionism's exclusivism upon the majority, indigenous population, has left a deep and still festering wound. Perhaps the most that realistic men can hope to achieve in such circumstances is to help close the wound with sutures which are, at least, antisepticized against the old infection. There will be scar-tissue for a long time, assuming the healing process can be started. But if we operate cleanly and repair as much as we conscientiously can intelligently, time may replace the scar-tissue with fully healed and more pliable, healthy flesh. Time—and at least formal peace—could eventually create conditions in which open societies in both Israel and the Arab world would allow for free intercourse between people. For all practical purposes this might, with the mellowing of attitudes, be accepted as a practical equivalent of the restoration of the rights of the Palestinians, regardless of faith or race. This, it seems to me, should at least be the posture upon which the United States should insist as we pursue the newest phase of what was, in its inception, described as an "American initiative."

There is, of course, no guarantee that a compromise predicated upon containment of Zionism would produce peace. All we know is that the encouragement of Zionism has created war and the increasing impairment of American influence and interests. Advocacy of such a policy of containment therefore, would leave us, at least, no worse off than we have been; and there would be the distinct benefit of exercising the power we possess in support of policies which are consistent with our values, our laws and our interests. Such policies could be reinforced with guarantees of security for the legitimate nationals of Israel. Israel would then be forced to orient its destiny to the Middle East instead of constantly escalating its dependency upon "the Jewish people," most of whom do not live in the state and have no intention of ever living there. It would also remove from the minds of the Arabs—and as a reality to them—the explosive threat of expansionist Zionism, to use the language once employed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

But most of all, Mr. President, even if your advocacy of such a formula did not produce all of these desirable results, the prestige and integrity of the United States would be enhanced throughout the world, for we would have used our power and prestige to support a solution to one of the world's most dangerous problems which will be consistent with the best and most admired of our own, national tradition.

If there is ever any way in which I may be of service to you, particularly in amplifying the central thesis of this letter and its considered references to the inconsistency between Zionism and American values and law, on the one hand, and Middle East peace, on the other hand, please call upon me.

Very respectfully yours,

ELMER BERGER
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

Rabbi Elmer Berger
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.
New York

February 19, 1971

Dear Rabbi Berger:

Thank you for your most recent letter to the President about the situation in the Middle East. Your position is well understood here.

All of us realize that there are a multitude of ways, as well as sharp disagreements, on how best to achieve peace in the Middle East. You have detailed a case in support of a fundamental change in the philosophy which has played an important role in the establishment and survival of Israel to the present time. Likewise, many have made the case that only a similar revolution in the total complex of Arab attitudes toward Israel could bring peace.

Whatever the precise prescription for peace, we have felt that the profound changes in attitudes essential to peace are unlikely to develop in the absence of conditions which would allow relaxation of tension and time for sober consideration of the long-term future. In the closing passages of your letter you, too, noted the benefits that peace, plus time, may have in producing changes in outlook that are essential to healing the wounds. Creation of these conditions has been a high priority order of business for this Administration. It has concentrated for two years on efforts to bring about a settlement which would enable the parties to turn their attention at last to the pursuits of peace.

In such a climate, both sides will have much to do in setting their course for the future, for the area is far from being a

settled one. Whether there is debate on the issue of which you wrote, is up to those most intimately concerned. However, it should be kept in mind that every U.S. Administration since 1948 has supported the legitimacy, integrity and continued national existence of Israel, and in this they have not been alone. This remains one element in the effort to achieve peace.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

NOBLE M. MELENCAMP
Staff Assistant
to the President

Mr. Noble M. Melencamp
Staff Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

March 19, 1971

Dear Mr. Melencamp:

Thank you for your informative letter of February 19th, replying to my letter of January 11th to the President. I have just returned from a two week visit to the Middle East. Among other things, I participated in a symposium on Palestine held in Kuwait and financed in large part by the Kuwaiti government....

The Kuwait experience reinforced the central idea in my letters to the President of August 25, 1970, and January 11, 1971. That is to say the question of the rights of the Palestinians—more than borders, transit and trade—is the central issue in the half-century problem.

Because, ultimately, the present diplomacies—to which both the President and the Secretary of State attach so much importance—may succeed or fail over this central problem, I take the liberty of attempting to clarify several of your comments on my January 11 letter.

1. It is not accurate to say that my ideas represent "a fundamental change in the philosophy which has played an important role in the establishment and survival of Israel to the present time."

a. The basic agreement supporting the creation "in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people" is, of course, the Balfour Declaration. This unilateral policy statement by the British government received international status when it was incorporated in the Mandate. The United States became a party to it in a Convention with the British government, signed December 3, 1924.

There can be no argument that the promise to "facilitate" the national home *in Palestine* was explicitly restricted by two other commitments of transcending importance. The first of these stated it was to be "clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice" the rights of the non-"Jewish people" nationals of Palestine—its Christian and Moslem Arabs and, presumably also, its anti-Zionist Jews. Secondly, it was also to be "clearly undestood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the rights and political status of Jews in any other country."

b. The so-called "Churchill White Paper" of July 1, 1922, explicitly declared against "Unauthorized statements ... to the effect that ... Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English'."

c. The Partition Recommendation of November 29, 1947, chapter 3, paragraph 1, states:

> *Citizenship:* Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the city of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the city of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy *full civil and political rights.* (emphasis supplied)

The United States recognized, *de facto,* the independence of Israel on May 15, 1948. Inasmuch as the United States

was a party to the November 29, 1947 General Assembly Resolution, it was legally obligated to require Israel to respect this demand for "full civil and political rights" for *all* Palestinian citizens who could establish their claims to residence in the so-called "Jewish State."

d. By the end of 1948, the Israeli refusal to honor this requirement had created a refugee population of Christian and Moslem Arabs. This fact led to the General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948, calling for the establishment of a Conciliation Commission. The same resolution (para. 11) required "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return...."

This resolution, in one form or another, has been reiterated by the appropriate body of the United Nations every year since 1948. The United States has consistently supported it.

e. As cited in my letter of August 25, 1970, the United States Government has declared as a matter of legal principle, that Israel's "Jewish people" nationality concept is not a valid concept of international law. The formal exchange with the Department of State which resulted in this declaration of legal principle leaves no doubt that it would be inconsistent with American law for the United States to be a party to any formula designed to guarantee the state of Israel a "Jewish character," predicated as it must be, by definition, on distinctions based on religious faith.

The President's reported commitment to limit the options of the refugees in the interests of maintaining the "Jewish character" of the State of Israel is inconsistent with all of these international agreements. Furthermore, taking into account the supra-national attributes of Israel's "Jewish people" nationality base, as legislated and defined by the legislative and judicial branches of the Israeli government, makes the

President's reported endorsement of Israel's "Jewish character" a contributory factor in the impairment of the "rights and political status" of American Jews. For a principal reason why the present Zionist government of Israel wants to maintain the state's "Jewish character" is precisely to sustain and advance this illegal nationality concept. The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency, as the predecessor of the state of Israel and its creator, historically rejected *all* democratic, political solutions of the Palestine problem so that a "Jewish" majority could be invested with sovereignty.

Such a sovereignty, predicated upon this discriminatory nationality in which "Jewish people" nationals are "more equal than others," was finally—even if precariously—established by force and has been maintained for more than 20 years by persistent Israeli defiance of United Nations' resolutions which call for the refugees to have free choices between repatriation and compensation. The Israelis have acknowledged their *moral* culpability in this refugee problem by their repeated offers to provide compensation. But for *political* reasons they have adamantly and consistently rejected repatriation.

The objective of this policy—along with the parallel Israeli policy of recruiting ("in-gathering") Jewish immigrants—has been to perpetuate the "Jewish character" of the state. Responsible Zionist—and now Israeli governmental—leaders have always regarded the "Jewish character" of the state to be an indispensable pre-requisite for inscribing, advancing and then implementing "Jewish people" nationality legislation in international law. That legislation, as the Department of State has ruled, is illegal. Unless the President's broad agreement to support the "Jewish character" of Israel is, therefore, stringently qualified by requiring Israel to respect the rights of non-"Jewish people" Palestinians and also to revoke her "Jewish people" nationality legislation and the incursions, based on this legislation, into the "rights and political status of Jews in any other country," the President's

broad commitment must also be regarded as illegal.

Against the background of these facts and this law it is the President's commitment—if indeed commitment is the accurate word—which represents a "fundamental change in the philosophy" with which the entire international community has historically provided whatever political legitimacy the state of Israel possesses.

By persistently devious means the Zionist Organization has flouted these historical limitations of its own idea of an arbitrarily created and sustained "Jewish " majority in its state. And it is precisely the consequent flouting of the rights of non-"Jewish people" nationals of Palestine and the acquiescence of United States (and other) governments in the Zionist Organization's implementation of its illegal "Jewish people" nationality which has created the conflict in the Middle East, altered the political status of American Jews and cost the United States its once very great prestige and reputation for democratic integrity in the extensive areas and among so many of the people of the Middle East.

Because the President's recent initiatives show at least some promise for success I continue to emphasize the crucial character of this consideration. For disillusion and frustration will be greatly increased if this effort at peace fails; and it will be even more tragic if failure should result because of an American commitment to the illegal flouting of democratic principles and international agreements by the Zionist apparatus which established the Israeli state and whose "philosophy" continues to dominate its policies. American responsibility for such a failure would be particularly ironic since, as my January 11 letter demonstrated, it is the failure of the United States Government to apply existing, relevant legislation to the Israel/Zionist operations within the United States itself which accounts for most of the dynamics for Israel's continuing policies of discrimination and exclusivism.

2. The second point in your letter which deserves comment and clarification is the statement that "whether there is

debate on the issue of which you wrote, of course, is up to those most intimately concerned." You do not specify who these parties may be—and the character of Israel's "Jewish people" nationality recommends specification. Certainly, if the parties you have in mind are the Israeli government and the government of the U.A.R. and/or other Arab parties to the conflict, then the issue has already been raised in the form of a just solution to the problem of the refugees. This is the context in which the President reportedly made the United States commitment in question. The refugee problem is considered by many to be the central issue. The implication of the President's commitment therefore, is that the United States has accepted an Israeli pre-condition to any resolution of the most important problem to be resolved if peace is to be established.

At this point it is of the utmost importance to clarify our position in the context of the last sentence of your letter. If I read this sentence correctly it suggests that for the United States to insist upon fulfillment of the international agreements which guarantee the grihts of non-"Jewish people" Palestinians, as well as the unaltered "rights and political status of Jews" of other countries is, somehow, to be equated with impairment of "the legitimacy, integrity and continued national existence of Israel."

I do not believe this follows. On the contrary it can be eloquently—and responsibly—argued that these attributes of the Israeli state have been imperiled constantly for the more than 20 years of the state's existence precisely because the state (and the Zionist Organization before it) violated every agreement in which these rights of others than "Jewish people" nationals have been inscribed. It is obvious today that lack of universal recognition of Israel's "legitimacy" accounts for the threat to Israel's "integrity." And except for the massive support of the United States, Israel's "national existence" would be in serious international straits, indeed.

This abnormal relationship created the regrettable polariza-

tion of national interests in the Middle East. If the "legitimacy" of Israel's sovereignty is ever to rest upon something more than this kind of exaggerated American support, there can be little doubt of the necessity for Israel to comply—in far greater degree than it has—with the rights guaranteed in international agreements to the non – "Jewish people" nationals of Palestine and for termination of Israeli policies which impair the integrity of the nationality status of Jews in other countries. The United States is in a unique position to require an end to both these categories of illegitimacy.

To do so is not at all the same as threatening the national existence of Israel. It is however, to assure—or at the least to take such steps as are within the power of the United States to assure—that a state for which this democracy has so large a measure of responsibility discharges its fundamental and juridically recognized obligations of human and democratic rights toward those who have been recognized as possessing valid claims to those rights.

3. Finally, permit me to say that my suggestions to the President were not intended—nor do I think they qualify—as "ways...best to achieve peace in the Middle East." The tactics of the President and his associates handling this problem are not the subject of the concerns to which my part of this correspondence has been addressed. I have tried to focus attention on a substantive question of transcendent importance. I have not recommended a procedural or methodological formula for coming to grips even with this substantive problem. My purpose has been to caution, on the basis of long experience and recognized, responsible knowledge, *against* an American position which would contribute to perpetuating *the* central injustice and aggression in Palestine. I reiterate my conviction—widely supported by many who understand the Palestine problem—that it will be tragic if the present hopes for peace should be dissipated by a position in which the United States lends its power and prestige not only to this central illegitimacy but to values and concepts of law

which are inconsistent with the most admirable traditions —and those most worthy of emulation—in the American system.

I am not sure there is any eagerness for full and frank face-to-face discussions of these issues. If there is, I would be very happy to discuss them with you at some time of mutual convenience; and I would be glad, also, to bring with me our own legal counsel who has distinguished himself in the international law aspects of these problems.

Above all, in the interests of that clarification and understanding which the American people need if they are to play their proper role in supporting any Middle East peace effort worthy of their advocacy, I hope you will share with me any further thinking on the problem suggested by this letter.

Very sincerely yours,

ELMER BERGER
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

Mr. Noble M. Melencamp
Staff Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

May 20, 1971

Dear Mr. Melencamp:

I wonder if there is any intention of answering my letter to you of March 19th, xerox copy of which I enclose.

I have shown this letter and my earlier ones of August 25, 1970, and of January 11, 1971, together with your reply of February 19, 1971, to a few knowledgeable friends. A number of them are urging me to publish the exchange because they feel it illuminates some of the more fundamental issues of the Arab/Israel/Zionist conflict.

While I realize that such action is, in the final analysis, my prerogative, my original purpose in writing the President was not publicity. Now I would not want to publish the correspondence, leaving the impression that my March 19 letter is the last word if indeed, some meaningful reply is contemplated.

I will appreciate your advice in this matter, or—if possible—preferably a reply to my latest communication.

Very sincerely yours,

ELMER BERGER
President
American-Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

Mr. Noble M. Melencamp
The White House
Washington, D.C.

July 15, 1971

Dear Mr. Melencamp:

I regret, very much, that after nearly 4 months neither you nor any other member of the Administration has found it possible to reply to either of my letters of March 19 and May 20.

There are times when even no answer is eloquent. In my humble judgment the most eloquent testimony in reply to my earlier communications to you now comes from the Middle East itself. The unwillingness of the American government —once again—to formulate any policy for confronting the fundamentals of the 50 year old Arab/Israel/Zionist conflict has produced the latest failure to protect our national interests in the area, let alone to try to establish an enduring peace based upon justice.

The all but total collapse of the "American initiative" is simply a more profound and portentous reflection of the

inability of the White House to offer any meaningful reply to my March 19 letter. It may also reflect the lack of courtesy which, apparently, militated against even a routine acknowledgement of my respectful letter of May 20.

In these circumstances I am sure you—and your associates—will understand my evaluation of the situation as stated in the enclosed copy of our *Report 11* (June 1971)*, beginning with the marked section on page 12 and continuing through page 32. You will also understand why I have given permission for publication of this correspondence in book form; and why, in my very crowded lecture and writing schedule, I intend to identify the present Administration with a continuation of the inept and self-defeating Middle East policies of previous American governments.

I am rather sure Mr. Nixon—and his associates—are hoping against hope that informed and responsible people (in which I presume to include myself) will remain a minority until after 1972. There is clear evidence—outside of politics—that this may be a vain hope. But whether it is or not, sensitive and responsible Americans are wondering if presidents, and their staff people, learn anything from the publication of the "Pentagon Papers." Following years when others huckstered our national interests in the Middle East to Zionist votes and money, Mr. Nixon had a rare opportunity to develop a rational American policy. I should say that your apparent unwillingness or inability to respond to my March 19 letter indicates he has now passed the buck as did his predecessors. And with the speed at which events are now moving in the Middle East it may just be that you—and he—will find nowhere to pass it.

So are problems radicalized. After a long and—I believe—honorable and responsible career involved with the Middle East I do not intend to become, myself, a "radical." But

*[A newsletter circulated among the members of American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism. – ed.]

you—and your associates—have provided me and others with still another justification for those who find themselves with growing disrespect for "the system."

Very truly yours,

ELMER BERGER
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

REPORT 11

June, 1971

Despite the encouraging and substantial interest in this correspondence from respectable sources, the White House continues to demonstrate a rather distinct lag or, at least, less than enthusiasm for answering in writing. The exchange began last August. Our latest communication was sent on March 19th. We were indirectly informed that a reply was in preparation. It is always difficult to determine what is a respectful waiting period for a meaningful reply from the Executive Branch of the government. The exchange is formal and a matter of record. The situation is delicate. The White House is busy with many problems. On the other hand a favorite practise in Washington is to hope difficult and politically unpopular problems will go away.

Our March 19 letter indicated that Mr. Melencamp (Staff Assistant to the President) was way off base in his February 19 letter to us. We were prepared to allow him a comfortable time to reorganize his thinking about the central issues. We do not know much about Mr. Melencamp other than that he is one of the President's professional letter-writers. If he does not himself know the answers to some specific questions, the American people are under the illusion that they pay taxes, in part at any rate, to provide such "staff-assistants" with competent and knowledgeable experts.

In any event, more than two months seemed ample time for a formal acknowledgement, if not for a responsive reply. If the President had not had good reason for promising to guarantee "the Jewish character of the State of Israel," he should have had, or not made the public statement. Or—in some ten months since he first made the statement—he might have found some reasons. Failing all of these, Mr. Melencamp could have found some way to try to take off the heat, or to say the President did not mean what he seemed to have said, or he might have found some other star-dust in the bag of professional double-talk which is on every Washington bureaucrat's desk. After all, what are "staff assistants" for! And at current prices!

Whatever the explanation, there was no answer by May 20th and so we sent Mr. Melencamp the following, gentle reminder.

[There followed a copy of Dr. Berger's May 20, 1971 letter. See above. –ed.]

The substance of our communications is recognized to have fundamental relevancy to the much discussed "just and enduring peace in the Middle East." It has relevancy also to the application and enforcement of United States law, for which this or any other American government is responsible. The presentation of our views on these important issues were responsibly prepared and respectfully submitted. *Our* action exemplified the American "system" at its best. There were no threats, no demonstrations, no burnings. But the *system* stands dumb and unresponsive or uninformed when—on rare occasions—it attempts to be responsive.

The experience, therefore, suggests why so often the most politically sensitive problems often become radicalized. On the one hand, our "leaders" are reluctant to delineate for the American people the *fundamental* issues in such problems; and, on the other hand, the same "leaders" move only when a safe political base exists in order to obviate political risks. Meanwhile, it is not considered "radical" for known special-privilege and special-interest groups to do *their* thing. They are able to do this quietly and surreptitiously, operating in the murky spaces between what knowledgeable officials know needs to be done but are politically afraid to do, on the one hand, and the "silent majority," who are silent mostly because they do not know either the issues or the facts, on the other hand. This is precisely how the Zionist lobby is operating today. It is avoiding those spectacular and frontal confrontations it has so often employed in the past. The managers of the "system" believe they are checking Zionist moves, but they believe so little in what they are doing that their "system" displays obvious lack of interest in dealing with serious people in serious and responsible ways. This is always the point at which more radical forces are encouraged to move. This is now what is happening in the Palestine problem. All the establishments are playing the "old politics" and engaging in the usual discussions of diplomacy, accompanied by escalated armaments and the threats of still more. Those who have had their fill of these charades are taking over.

"Palestine" is a crusade on the "Left" almost everywhere, including Israel. The "Jewish establishment" is particularly disturbed about this development in the United States. There is special anxiety about Jewish youth, some of whom are moved to the Left because of their peace-interests, including a rejection of

Israel's policies of military occupation; and some of whom come to their anti-Zionism out of basic commitment to the Left. In the Middle East itself, the dereliction of the West with respect to Arab rights has driven increasing numbers of established Arab governments to the Left. And the practise of ignoring—for nearly a quarter of a century now—the rights of the Christian and Moslem Palestinians has opened the Resistance to forces even more radical than those now threatening in some Arab states. The politics of the old-line politicians—of whatever country—may stand mute and immobilized by the uninformed "silent majority," fed on managed news and by the publicity agents of the special interest groups. But the human, elementary needs of deprived people for their homes and for recognition of their human dignity are dynamics which eventually erupt through the encrusted bureaucracy. And there are always those, angry at "the system" for many reasons, prepared to feed the increasing, volcanic pressures of the humans who have been deprived.

To recognize this syndrome—both on the Jewish and the general stage—is not automatically to applaud or endorse it. But it is foolhardy simply to rail at the protest as if it had no justifiable cause at all. When a professional letter-writer on the White House staff cannot provide an intelligent, knowledgeable and responsive reply after 10 months of correspondence there may be something very sick in "the system." The sickness may be that despite its rhetoric about an "enduring peace," this Administration is prepared to join the historic conspiracy of silence on the fundamental legal and moral questions involved in the Palestine problem. If this diagnosis is accurate "the system" is headed for another descent toward chaos on the long downward spiral of American influence and credibility in an area of the world where interests are so massive that war could come in an effort to fill the vacuum left by failure again to confront the historically recognized ingredients of a genuinely just and enduring peace.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Washington, D.C.

August 6, 1971

Dear Fellow American:

President Nixon has asked me to reply to your comments on the Middle East.

We appreciate your taking the time to let us know your views. Please be assured that they are being brought to the attention of the officers concerned.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing some literature which may be of interest to you. If I can be of further service, please let me know.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM D. BLAIR, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

Enclosures.

PUBLIC INFORMATION SERIES
BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States has historic and continuing interests in the Middle East. We maintain long-standing and friendly relationships with various nations in the area. However, we have no treaty or other agreement with any of the parties to the Middle East conflict which commits us to support or participate in defense arrangements of any kind. In situations like the one in the Middle East, radical factions can force the hand of moderate elements. The possibility of confrontation between the major powers clearly increases when regional warfare erupts. To forestall this danger, the United States has worked to promote a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

US Restraint in Supplying Arms to Area

Over the years we avoided becoming a major supplier of arms to the states of the area, most of whom made their purchases in Europe. Since 1967, however, the Soviet Union has sent massive quantities of arms to the Middle East and has given support to those who have threatened or encouraged aggressive actions against Israel or their Arab neighbors. To fail to help those who look to us for support in countering threats to their national security would be self-defeating. Our ability to avoid direct military involvement has rested in part on the maintenance of an appropriate military balance among the parties, so that potential aggressors would have no illusions about their chances for success. President Nixon and Secretary Rogers have consistently reaffirmed our intention to assist in maintaining such a balance. This policy of balance has, we believe, been an important factor in achieving and maintaning a cease-fire since August 1970.

Both publicly and privately we have sought to achieve some form of limitation of all arms shipments to the area. Regrettably, the Soviet Union has not shown any inclination to cooperate.

Until effective limitations are agreed upon, we are convinced that our policy of maintaining the military balance, but avoiding actions which would lead to an escalating arms race, is the best way to promote stability and a peaceful settlement.

We are keeping a close watch on the situation so we can respond to any further Soviet moves to increase armaments in the area. As the President stated in his June 1, 1971 news conference, we are making no specific judgments about possible consequences of the recently signed Soviet-Egyptian treaty. We will, however, be alert to any practical developments that might weigh against military stability in the Middle East.

US Assistance to Israel and Moderate Arab States

The United States has equipped Israel and friendly Arab states with the arms essential to their self-defense. Our assistance to Israel has taken into account Soviet arms shipments to Egypt.

At the same time, we are assisting friendly Arab states who have turned to us for help in meeting their legitimate defense requirements. These nations are resisting the pressures of those who advocate resort to violence. Fearing the prospects of increased Soviet influence over their affairs, these nations have also resisted offers of Soviet military assistance. The aid we are giving these states will permit them to continue their support for the efforts of the United Nations and others to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. The consequent stability of such a settlement will help insure security and economic advancement for all peoples in the area.

Settlement Cannot be Imposed

It is clear that a peaceful settlement cannot be imposed by one side or the other by military means; this is the key to the idea that a balance of military power can work for peace. We are hopeful that progress toward a peaceful settlement will be possible through continuation of the ceasefire and further talks under the auspices of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring. We are also hopeful that Israel and Egypt will develop interim arrangements which would see a lessening of military tension, a return of normal civilian life in the Suez region and the reopening of the Canal itself. This could play a constructive part in the movement toward an overall peace settlement and, in response to the request of both sides, we are seeking to play a helpful diplomatic role to that end.

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UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL

The United States has enjoyed close and friendly relations with Israel since the establishment of that state in 1948 and attaches great importance to the maintenance of Israel's national security and political independence. We keep the military situation in the Middle East under continuing review, particularly in light of Soviet military shipments to and involvement in the area, and have pursued a consistent policy of helping Israel maintain an effective defense capability. Our aid to Israel is in the form of arms supplies and financial assistance to help meet Israel's needs in these two important respects.

Public statements by Israeli leaders have confirmed our judgment that Israel's strength remains sufficient to meet any foreseeable Arab military challenge. Both President Nixon and Secretary Rogers have expressed our intention to watch carefully for any sign of further Soviet arms escalation as a result of the recently signed Soviet-Egyptian treaty. Our actions, as in the past, will be guided by our policy of maintaining a balance of military power in the area, while exercising the maximum restraint in arms deliveries consistent with that policy.

All interests in the Middle East can best be served by a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. We are hopeful that progress toward a peace settlement will be possible through continued military restraint and through continuation of talks under the auspices of UN Special Representative Gunnar Jarring. We are also hopeful that Israel and Egypt will develop interim arrangements which would see a lessening of military tension, a return of normal civilian life in the Suez region and the reopening of the Canal itself. We are convinced this could play a constructive part in the movement toward an over-all peace settlement and, in response to the request of both sides, are seeking to play a helpful diplomatic role to that end.

We do not underestimate the obstacles and difficulties ahead in the search for peace in the Middle East. Progress will be possible only if all concerned show moderation and flexibility and if the parties to the conflict are willing to accept something less than their maximum positions.

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ORAL MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT NIXON READ ON JANUARY 25, 1970 BEFORE THE JEWISH LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

I am aware of your deep concern that Israel may become increasingly isolated. This is not true as far as the United States is concerned.

The United States stands by its friends. Israel is one of its friends.

The United States is deeply engaged in trying to help the people of the Middle East find peace. In this effort, we are consulting fully with all those most concerned.

The United States believes that peace can be based only on agreement between the parties and that agreement can be achieved only through negotiations between them. We do not see any substitute for such negotiations if peace and security arrangements acceptable to the parties are to be worked out.

The United States does not intend to negotiate the terms of peace. It will not impose the terms of peace. We believe a durable peace agreement is one that is not one-sided and is one that all sides have a vested interest in maintaining. The United Nations resolution of November 1967 described the principles of such a peace.

We are convinced that the prospects for peace are enhanced as the governments in the area are confident that their borders and their people are secure.

The United States is prepared to supply military equipment necessary to support the efforts of friendly governments, like Israel's, to defend the safety of their people. We would prefer restraint in the shipment of arms to this area. But we are maintaining a careful watch on the relative strength of the forces there, and we will not hesitate to provide arms to friendly states as the need arises.

The United States has as its objective helping the people of the Middle East build a peaceful and productive future. I believe that all Americans can unite for that goal.

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TEXT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 OF NOVEMBER 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
   (i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;
2. Affirms further the necessity
   (a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
   (b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
   (c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of this resolution.
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C.

September 7, 1971

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a routine form letter from the Public Affairs office of the Department of State. The letter was received on August 25, which, by pure coincidence, happens to be the first anniversary of the date on which I initially wrote you asking clarification of two reported statements —made either by you or members of you staff—in which you indicated United States support for something identified as "the Jewish character" of Israel. During the elapsed year I have written four carefully documented letters suggesting that this reported commitment to the so-called "Jewish character" of Israel represents a serious breach of all the international agreements on "Palestine" as well as being inconsistent with principles which the Department of State enunciated on this same question in conformity with the Constitution of the United States. To these carefully written letters I have had the courtesy—in a year—of one reply. On the whole, this reply, dated February 9, 1971, and signed by your Mr. Melencamp, was irrelevant and uninformed. Nevertheless, since that date I have written two more letters, still seeking only clarification. One was dated March 19. No reply at all was received. On July 15 I wrote again, asking only if there was any intention of replying to the March 19 letter. Again there has been no reply at all, unless Mr. Blair's undignified and wholly irrelevant form letter, dated August 6 (and delivered on August 25) is to be considered your government's reply.

I am constrained to say that such practises by an Administration which urges the people of this nation to revive the "spirit of 1776" and the American "work ethic," and which appeals to the moral values and initiative of individual citizens is shocking.

All this might be less objectionable if the much publicized efforts of your Administration to facilitate a peace in the Middle East had produced any genuinely encouraging results over these two-and-a-half years. But they have not. I do not know if the phrase "preventive diplomacy" has come to your attention. The phrase is used very often to describe the thrust —and the results—of these Middle East efforts. It suggests, of course, a procedure of retreat from establishing a "just and enduring peace" to one of trying to preserve an an elusive *status quo* in which not only are American interests increasingly jeopardized, but the people of the area, themselves, are increasingly endangered and subjected to bloodshed and suffering. In these circumstances it would seem reasonable that the ideas and experience of Americans long involved in this problem—and with established reputations for responsibility and even proven accuracy in predicting developments—might be welcomed. But unresponsive and demeaning reactions from your Administration—à la Mr. Blair's prefabricated letter—are turning more and more such Americans into sympathizers with those who believe justice in the Palestine problem may have to come only through the further employment of force.

I have little hope that letter will reach you—or anyone else with any authority—any more than my previous efforts. You leave me—and many like me—with no alternative other than to be critical of your government's policies in the Middle East. If the criticism is unjustified your Administration is at fault, because there has been no apparent interest in interpreting your policies, or clarifying them, to any who are informed and interested enough to ask intelligent questions. Personally, I now feel free to make such public use of my correspondence as, in my judgment, will emphasize the inadequacies of your policies.

I regret the necessity for writing the President of the United States in this tone. In your own public pronouncements you have urged working within the system and consultation rather

than confrontation. I can say only that in this historically bedevilled problem of "Palestine" nothing done by any member of your Administration suggests continuing or intellectual obligation to heed your pleas.

Very respectfully yours,

ELMER BERGER
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

Rabbi Elmer Berger
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.
New York

September 28, 1971

Dear Rabbi Berger:

I would like to reply to your letter of July 15 to Mr. Noble Melencamp, since I have now assumed his responsibilities here. I am fully aware of the views you have shared on the Middle East problem in the past, both with the President and with members of the staff.

I would like to make two observations. The first is that your thinking over this period has been well known and fully considered here. I would want to correct any impression that your views are ignored.

The second pertains to the Administration's position in response to your letters. This was concisely stated in Mr. Melencamp's letter to you last February 19. As I am sure you

appreciate, the issue boils down to attitudes towards the State of Israel and our respective positions are known to each other. We have felt that there is room on issues of this complexity for honest men to disagree, and we would like to think you share this view.

One final point. You speak of the "all but total collapse" of the U.S. initiative of last year, yet the cease-fire has now been in effect for more than a year. For my part, I would not want to dismiss the important implications of the cease-fire which brought to a halt the rapidly escalating military action and casualties which characterized the first seven months of 1970.

With my best wishes,

Sincerely,

MICHAEL B. SMITH
Staff Assistant

Mr. Michael B. Smith, Staff Assistant
The White House
Washington, D.C.

December 2, 1971*

Dear Mr. Smith:

Thank you for your letter of September 28. I appreciate your assurance that our views are fully considered.

It is difficult to respond to your observation that the difference between the Administration and positions we have advanced "boils down to attitudes toward the State of Israel." The difficulty derives from the lack of clarity about what the Administration means by the term "Jewish character of the State of Israel," which has been the principal thrust of my part of this correspondence.

*[Dr. Berger was persuaded by friends not to mail an earlier and angrier reply to Mr. Smith's letter of September 28. – ed.]

I regret that I can find no evidence warranting a reappraisal of my judgment of "all but total collapse" of the U.S. peace initiative of the last year and more. The cease-fire was to be a step toward a meaningful peace. As an end in itself, it is a reward to the government of Israel of territory which it occupied during its armed attacks of June 6-10, 1967. The maintenance and exploitation of these conquests is a continuing violation of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and threatens the destruction of the security system of the Charter. The longer the government of Israel occupies these territories and develops Israeli projects in them (in violation of article 49(6) of the Geneva Civilians Convention) the more difficult it becomes to achieve a just and meaningful peace. The facts are that substantial parts of these Israeli expansions are financed by Zionist funds which originate in the United States.

We support the Administration's decision to refuse additional phantom aircraft to Israel at this time. We earnestly hope the Administration will not alter this decision under pressure based upon the pretext that the Soviet Union is supplying Egypt with "Badger" aircraft. The *Washington Post* (November 21, 1971, page 4, columns 1-4) and other responsible sources have indicated Egypt derives little or no military advantage from these aircraft. If the United States does provide further Phantoms, great political losses to the United States along with corresponding Soviet gains will certainly follow.

My associates and I still hope this Administration will practice the statemanship which President Eisenhower used in 1956 and 1957. If it does, the vast majority of American Jews are loyal citizens of this country and they will support President Nixon as they did President Eisenhower. They will distinguish American interests from those of Zionist/Israel as soon as our Government makes the distinction itself and acts upon it.

We still hope for a meeting with members of the White House Staff at an early time. Time is running out on the U.S.

Government's credibility as a constructive force in these crucial issues.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

ELMER BERGER
President
American Jewish Alternatives
to Zionism, Inc.

ELMER BERGER, a graduate of the University of Cincinnati (1930) and Hebrew Union College (1932), was one of the founders of the American Council for Judaism and has served as National Executive Director and Executive Vice-President of that organisation. His long career as a rabbi and community leader has been spent in leading the opposition to Zionism among American Jews and in fostering a better understanding of the Middle East among Americans generally. He is currently President of American Jewish Alternatives to Zionism, Inc.

Other Books by Elmer Berger

The Jewish Dilemma (New York: Devin-Adair, 1946)

A Partisan History of Judaism (New York: Devin -Adair, 1951)

Who Knows Better Must Say So (New York: American Council for Judaism, 1955). Reprinted with a new introduction by the author (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970)

Judaism or Jewish Nationalism (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957)

A Just Peace in the Middle East (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971) (co-author)

OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY THE INSTITUTE

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Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem
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by Alan Taylor
1970, 118 pages, 7 L.L. (paper), 13 L.L. (hard cover)

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by Richard P. Stevens
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